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Abstract
Current development shows that financial system tends to move to the direc
tion where controls over banking system would be very minimum. Banks are no
longer required to hold afraction of their assets as required reserve with the central
bank, and deposits are not subject to interest rate regulation. Fama (1980, 1983)
argues that with the absence of reserve ratio price detenninacy still holds through the
control over currency supply. However, recent development also indicates that the
control over currency supply is not any more in the hand of central banks but
determined by the demand of the people. Consequenthj, price level is uncontrollable.
Black (1970) even goes further to conclude that the unregulated banking system will
bring the traditional monetary theories to an end. This paper deals with the itnplica-
tions of recent developnent in financial system in Canada. This paper argues that
even thoiigh there is no longer reserve requirement and currency supply is deter
mined by demand side, the Bank of Canada still has control over nominal tnagnUude
of the economy, namely interest rates, which in turn influence aggregate demand and
prices.
THE DEFINITION OF RESERVE tively since 1981), excluding deposits held
REQUIREMENT in mortgage subsidiaries. These primary
In Canada reserve requirements - a reserves can be held as notes and coin (cur-
minimum fraction of chartered banks' rencies) in bank branches and automated
assets put on reserve at the Bank of Canada banking machines (ABMs) or as deposit
as aback up for various liabilities issued to balances with the Bank of Canada. In eitlier
finance lending activities - refer to require case, primary reserves earn no interest'
primary reserves (Sulfrin and Amsden, The difference between currency
1992). These reserves must be equal to a reserves and reserve requirement is the
certain percentage of deposits (10,3, and 3 amount of deposit balances at the Bank of
per cen for demand deposits, notice Canada that abank has to hold over certain
deposits, foreign currency deposits respec- averaging periods. The deposit balances are
•)PenuUs adalah dosen tetap Fakultas Ekonomt Universttas Islam Indonesia
'In some countries deposit balance earns interest In New Zealand, for example, this balance earns 65 percent ot
the seven-day Reserve Bank biU yield. See Dotsey (1991) and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1993).
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calculated by averaging deposits on the land (Carew, 1987).
banks' books on four consecutive Wednes- The key reason for this aboliHon is to
days, ending on the second Wednesday of reduce the burden on depository institu-
the preceding month (Freedman, 1992). If a tions and thereby allow them to becomebank falls below the required average on more competitive. Reserves requirements
one of tlie four Wednesdays, it must com- have always been like "tax" on banks and
pensate it on the other Wednesday. If it is tlieir clients, because reserve typically do
above the required average early on, it may not earn interests. This tax is equal to the
hold less than requirement later on. This interests the banks could have earned had
will effectively generate ademand by banks they been allowed to lend out the reserves,
for deposits at the Bank of Canada. By The Bank of Canada, on the other hand, re
adjusting the supply of such deposits invest the banks' reserves in securities to
relative to the demand, the Bank can put an earn profits (Sulfrin and Amsden, 1992).
upward or a downward pressure on over- Thistaxiseitherbomedirectly by the banks
night on interbank interest rates. This and their shareholders or passed on to cus-
mechanism will be very useful for Canada tomers via lower deposit rates, higher bor-
to implement its monetary policy when rowing rate, or reduced service. TTiis is part
reserve requirements are no longer needed, of the reason that, like any other tax, reserve
taxcan distort the allocativeprocess. BanksTHE ABOLITION OF RESERVE become less competitive and financial re-
REQUIREMENTS sources move away from them toward po-
The decline in required reserve raHo tentially less productive financial insHtu-
has characterized recent development in fi- tions not subject to reserve requirements,
nancial system across countries. In the past Moreover, the new legislation initi-
three years, for example, the Federal Re- ated by the goverment of Canada which
serve has lowered requirements on trans- will give non-bank financial institutions,
action deposits and eliminated require- such as trust companies, more powers to
ments on the deposits (Weiner, 1992). The make personal and corporate loans helps
central banks of Switzerland, New Zealand, prompt the removal of reserve requirements
Australia,and Canada have eliminated their (Freedman, 1992). Tlie difference between
requirements. The most dramatic decline banks and non-bank financial institutions
has accurred in Canada and New Zealand, then will become blur. They have similar
In June 1992, Canada proclaimed a provi- lending powers. If the reserve requirement
sion of comprehensive financial market isnotremoved from banks, while non-bank
legislation which sets the marginal reserve financial institutions are not subject to re-
requirement to zero and eliminates all serve requirement, then one would expect
reserve requirement over a two year that banks will not be able to compete with
period (Sulfrin and Amsden, other financial institutions. Here, one can1992). In February 1985, all compulsory ra- say that the availability of lending powers
bos, including reserverabo, were removed to non-bank financial institutions should
rom all financial instituHons in New Zea- rule out the reserve requirements on banks.
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This is also in line with what Patinkin once
predicted that there would be no
difference between banks and other finan
cial institutions when reserve requirements
were removed (Fama, 1980).
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The multiplier model
The model that is usually used to
examine the role of reserve requirements in
influencing economyis tiiemultipliermodel
of money supply. This model has been for
along time considered as providing a foun
dation for examining monetary control
issues. In this model, money supply M is
defined as equal to the value of currency C,
held by the non-bank private sector, plus
the value of checkable deposits D that the
non-bank public holds in depository insti
tutions. Thus
(1)M = C + D
Another important definition is the
monetary base B, which is the sum of the
value of currency held by the non-bank
sector plus the value of depository
institutions' reserves R. In equation form,
the monetary base is
(2)B = C + R
By manipulating these two equations
we will have:^
3 +C/D
(3) M = B( )
C/D + R/D
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where C/D is the ratio of currency to
transaction deposits held by the non-bank
private sector, and R/D is the ratio of re
serves to transaction deposits held by the
non-bank private sector. This last equation
says that the money supply can be control
led via the control over the base money.
The term in the bracket is money multiplier
whose value depends on the ratio of
currency to deposits and the ratio of re
serves todeposits (reserves ratio).Monetary
control can be conducted by manipulating
either one of these two ratios or both. The
smaller the reserve ratio the greater the
multiplier, hence, the greater the multiplier,
hence, the greater money supply overshoot.
The smaller the currency ratio to deposits
the greater multiplier, hence, the greater
the money supply overshoot. Therefore,
abandoning just one of these two ratios does
not necessarily mean the vanishing of
monetary control. The abolition of reserve
ratio only reduces, not eliminates, monetary
control. Monetary control still can be
conducted by controlling currency supply.
However, in a world where financial
system is getting less regulated, this model
has a serious problem. The problem lies in
the heart of the model, namely the concept
of money supply. To treat money supply as
equal to the value of transaction deposits
and the value of currency is no longer
relevant. Black (1970) says that there is no
such thing as money supply in such a world.
In Black's world deposits issued by banks
provide transaction services through an
. TTie first equation is divided by the second equa
tion, thus M/B = (C+D)/(C+R). If all terms on the right
sidearedividedbyD,thenM/B=(C/D+1 >/(C/D+R/ D).
49
J^andiji^etary Policy
access to accounting system of exchange.
Transaction using thissystem isa matterof
debiting and crediting bank accounts.
Executing transaction with a check means
an instruction to banks to credit as well as
debit theaccounts ofbothparties involved.
The competition among banks will allow
people to execute this debit-credit transac
tion at a lower cost and this makes cur
rency less interesting because it bears no
interest. The fact that banks must have li
abilities for all tlieir transaction deposits
held by non-bank private sector does not
permit to consider transaction deposits as
money. An additional amount of loans
made by banks must be financed by the
same amount of additional deposits. Loans
mustbe equal to deposits. One may argue
that it is not impossible that an individual
bankcanbein a deficit position, loansmade
exceed deposits. However, if there is a bank
running deficit there should be another
bank that is running surplus. Ifsomeone is
allowed to have a loan from a bank, so that
tliis bank is in a negative position by the
amount of this loan, then if this loan is used
in a transaction with another person and
this person deposits it in his bank, which
could be a different bank, then this bank
should bein a positive position by exactly
the same amount of the deficit of the first
bank. A transaction using checks would
only mean that a person's account at his
bank decreases and at the same time other
person's account increases exactly by the
same amount. Therefore, as a whole, banks
are in zero position. If there is such thing as
money supply, then, the banks' position
can not change it.
Another argument that excludes
deposits from money comes from Fama
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(1980, 1983). Deposits are not money
because theyare not perfectsubstitutesfor
currency. In Fama's world where financial
system is also unregulated, currency is
treated as numeraire upon which the price
system of the economy is based. If dollar is
the unit of account of the numeraire then
the price level isthe prices ofall other goods
in terms of currency, namely dollar. Even
though it always sells at face value and
bears no interest, currency is generally
accepted as medium of exchangedue to its
ability to calculate precise exchanges of
currency for goods. Costs of calculating
exchange values, then, are minimized.^This
cost minimzation can be considered as a
compensation for interests foregone. Tlius,
there exists a well-defined demand for real
currency which is separable from the de
mands for other assets. If this demand is
combined with thesupply ofcurrency, then
price level is determined. Price level control,
then, is a matter of controlling currency
supply.'* In contrast, interest bearing
'It is always the case tliat a good has an exactex
change value for currency, or that every good can be
statedeasily inthe unit ofaccount ofcurrency. Exchanges
between goods whose values are difficult to determine
against each otherwillgenerate asignificantly highcalcu
lation cost.
*Fama prefers tlie argument thatmonopoly ofcur
rency supply by central banks is efficient. The zero mar
ginal cost ofitsissuaneeand thenon-dJslortionary type of
tax of holding it account for this efficiency. He goes on
with an assertion that theprivate issueof bearersecurities
in small denomination that have greater chance to com
pete with currency must be restricted. Wallace (1983)
confirmsthis withacritical remark, thatsucha restriction,
when it is binding, tends tomisallocate resources. Hence,
for him, there isa trade off in such a circumstance between
adiieving pricelevel stability and achieving efficient re
sources allocation.
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deposits which give access to accounting
system ofexchange, require that transactors
agree that the value revealed by checks is
equal to thevalue of wealth against which
the deposits have claim. Information and
calculation that the values of goods
exchanged and assets represented by
deposits are equal is needeid. It is actually
. thebanks,throughclearing mechanism, that
do these things, and hence complete the
transactions which use deposits. Moreover,
since deposits are heterogeneous in the
sense that every deposit may represent a
claim to a different set of underlying assets,
it is veryunlikelythata generic depositcan
serve as numeraire. Therefore, even though
deposits can be substituted for currency
they are not perfect substitutes for each
other. Consequently, deposits are not
money.
Even though the above discussion
implies that currencyis the only component
of money supply, the roleof currency will
be so limited that it can be omitted. As said
earlier, competition amoong banks will
discouragetheuse ofcurrency. Transaction
services provided by banks will be
increasingly more convenient. So long as
the interest rate on bank accounts is posi
tive, people are likely to hold as small
amount of currency as possible. Thus, the
amount of currency is expected to be so
small,mainlydeterminedby the volume of
small payments and by the cost and
inconvenience of making payment by check
or credit card, that it can hardly account for
the supply of money. Furthermore, the
central bank can not control currency
supply because the amount of currency
issued to banks depends on requests, and
the amount hold by banks, in turn, is deter
JEP Vol. 2, No. 1,1997
^fandi,Monetary Policy
mined by the pattern of withdrawals and
deposits ofcurrency by the people and by
the cost of making transaction with the
government. The central bank can do
nothing when people withdraw or deposit
currency. All it can dois justaccommodate
the withdrawals and deposits. There is no
reason for the central bank to fix the amount
of currency outstanding. Consequently,
money supply represented by currency
supply, can not be determined by the
demand of the people. Hence, to define
money supply as currency supply is no
longer appropriate. Moreover, if Fama's
framework is followed, the consequence of
uncontrollability of currency supply is the
uncontrollability of price level. As a result,
alternative instruments should be available.
Reserves requirement, then, is the
only possible candidate to represent the
moneysupply. Fama (1980,1983) proposes
reserves requirement as an alternative
instrumetn for price level determination.
Because required reserves bear no interest
and are issued by the central bank, they
can be considered, like currency, as pure
nominal unit of account issued by the
central bank. As in the case of currency, if
the unit of account is ti be defined through
reserves, reserves must also have demand
and supply functions. Requiring banks to
hold some fraction of deposits with the
central bank as non^nterest bearing
reserves can create a well-defined real
demand for reserves. Here, the central bank
can control the nominal supply or reserves
and hence, as in the case of currency,
producea well-defined realunitof account,
namely the price level. Famaalso indicates
thata mix policy of controlling the sumof
reserves and currency is sufficient for
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determining price level. However, in
Canada and New Zealand banks are no
longer required to hold reserves, so they
are simply zero on the average.
Consequently, money supply is simply
vanishing and non of Fama's proposals is
applicable to the condition of these two
countries.
If we go back to the money
multiplier model, the aboliton of reserves
requirement is simply ruining the model
and controls over monetary aggregates
become impossible.-''
Interest Rates Approach
Money multiplier model discussed
earlier is not the only approach available to
central banks. Instead of using money
supply, central banks may use interest rates
as their intermediate target. This
intermediate target is thought to beclosely
related to the ultimate goal variables. In
countries like Canada and New Zealand,
theultimate goal variable isprice stability.®
This approach allows central banks to
eliminate reserves requirement, butrequires
close control over short-term interest rates
(Weiner, 1992). Usually, these short-term
interest rates are interbank interest rates,
the rates bank and other depository insti
tutions charge on one another for
short-term market interest rates as well as
exchange rates. Changes in interest rates
and exchange rates in turn affect spending
and inflation. Likeany other market interest
rate, an interbank rate is determined
through the interaction of the supply and
the demand for funds. In Canada, these
funds are usually called deposit balances.^
In this case, the supply ultimately comes
from the central bank, while the demand
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comes from the depository institutions.
There are two reasons for banks to
demand interbank funds or deposit
balances (Weiner, 1992). One, in financial
system where there is reserve requirement,
interbank fundsmaybeneededtohelpmeet
these requirements. Banks short of reserves
can raise funds in several ways. They can
call in loans or sell securities out of their
portfolio, for example. Alternatively, they
can borrow funds in the interbank market.
Tlie second reason, interbank funds are
needed to help meet clearing needs. A
common feature regarding clearing
mechanism is the maintenance of accounts
at the central bank or elsewhere through
which banks settle their payments with one
another.
Two conditions are necessary for an
interest rate targeting to be effective
(Weiner, 1992). First, the central bank must
have close control over the supply of
'Infad,usinga more simple model ofmoney multi
plier, ihe elimination of reserve requirement alone im
plies Ihecollapseofmonetary control. The model equates
the money supply to transaction deposits held bynon-
bank privatescdor. Tlius M=D, where Mismoneysupply
and Disdeposits.And reserverequirementisa fraction of
deposits, RR=rD. Therefore M=l/r RR which implies the
disappearance ofmonetary control follovving tlie elimi
nation of the reserve reiiuirement.See Weiner (1992).
*ln New Zealand, price stability was legislated ina
new Bank Ad,inDecember 1989, as themain objective of
monetary policy. It is defined as 0-2 percent annual in
creases in Consumer Price Index. See Reserve Bank of
New Zealand (1993).
Tn New Zealand, they are called settlement cash.
The Reserve Bank ofNew Zealand excercises monetary
policy bycontrolling thequantity of thissettlement cash
used tosettle interbankbalances among themselves and
between these banks and the Reserve Bank. This policy is
aUo aimed adinfluencing theshort-term overnight inter
est rates.
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"%• interbank funds on a weekly or even daily
basis. Second, the demand for interbank
funds must be reasonably predictable. If
these two conditions are met, the central
bank will be able to anticipate and offset
unwanted movements in the target
interbank rate. If the conditions are not met,
the interbank rate will fluctuate
undesirably. It is in this context that the
Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand implement their monetary
policy to control price level.
MONETARY POLICY UNDER ZERO
RESERVE REQUIREMENT
As in the previous system, under zero
^ reserve requirement the Bank ofCanada's
monetary policy is aimed at influencing the
behaviour of the overnight rate of interest.
Changes in this rate are expected to
influence other money market rates as well
as exchange rate, which in turn affect
spending and inflation. Under zero reserve
requirement, an examination should be
made that the Bank of Canada has the same
ability to influence the short-term interest
rates as in the previous system (Freedman,
1992). As mentioned before, two conditions
must be met in order for a policy to achieve
the short-term interest rate target. Tlie Bank
of Canada feels fairly sure that these two
conditions can be met because of the unique
structure of Canadian payment system and
its institutional framework. Tlie Canadian
financial system is highly concentrated
(Weiner, 1992). More than a dozen bank,
trust and mortgage loan companies, and
credit unions account for the biggest share
of assets held by Canada's roughly 800 de
pository institutions. Within the banking
sector the six largest banks controlled 90
JEPVol.2,No.l, 1997
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percent of all bank assets at the end of 1991.
The payments system is also highly con
centrate.Tlie payments system isoperated
by the Canadian Payments Association
(CPA) whose members settle one another
on the books of the Bank of Canada. Thir
teen large depository institutions,
including eight banks, have "Direct Qearer"
status. Not only do they represent
themselves but often also act as clearing
agents for other depository institutions
(indirect CPA members) as well. Tlirough
these accounts, daily net clearing gains and
losses among direct clearers are settled.
Hence, all payment items are settled on the
books of the Bank of Canada. Consequently,
the Bank of Canada can easily predict the
demand for settlement balances just by
contacting the direct clearers. The daily
control over the supply of interbank
settlement balances by the Bank is
conducted by adjusting tlie supply relative
to the demand by the direct clearers for
settlement balances. In doing so the Bank
of Canada transfer federal government
deposit into and out of the settlement
accounts of direct clearers. This control
technique is called the "drawdown/
redeposit mechanism". Tlierefore, the two
conditions necessary for an effective
interest rate targeting are met.
The Demand for Settlement Balance
The elimination of reserve
requirement will not eliminate a direct
clearer's requirement to maintain a deposit
account for check clearing purposes at the
Bank of Canada. As mentioned earlier, the
demand for deposits balances emerges
because of two reasons : to help meet re
serve requirement and to help meet clearing
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needs. %With the reserve requirement
eliminated deposit balancesare now needed
by direct clearer banks to settle among
themselves and between them and the Bank
of Canada. Thus^ the direct clearer banks
will continue to keep a balance at the bank
ofCanada which will eventually berequired
to be at least zero everyday. Accordingly,
their cash managers must be able to make
sure thatat theend ofan averaging period
the average deposit balance is zero.
However, itisnotalways easy tomeet
the zero average because checking
behaviour isunpredictable. To know exactly
during the day what checks a bank will
clear to other banks, and what checks other
bankswill cleartoit isalmost impossible. It
is often the case that when the clearing
exchange is complete, and the bank's new
closing deposit balance has been
determined, this new balance is much
higheror lowerthan projected. The clearer
bank is facing clearing gains when the
balance ispositive, andclearing losses when
the balance is negative. Regarding these
two surprises there is a requirement that
must be met. The requirement is that for
every negative balance (fall into overdraft)
on a particular day during the averaging
period, the direct clearer needs to hold a
positive balance on some otherdays in the
period, or pay a penalty at the end of the
period. Whether aclearer bank isinaverage
negative or average positive balanceat the
end of the period is determined by
calculating the cumulative settlement
balance.The cumulativesettlementbalance
refers to the difference between the sum of
daily positive settlement balances and the
sum of overdrafts (negativebalances). This
difference must beequal to or greater then
54
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zero over a calculation period of about a
month, from the third Wednesday to third
Wednesday of the following month. If a
clearer bank ends up with a negative
cumulative settlement balance it has to take
an advance from the bank of Canada at the
Bank rate. Hence, the direct clearer
effectively has to compensate an overdraft
with a positive balance, a cumulative
advance, or a fee equal to interest on
advance (Freedman, 1992).
From theclearerbank's pointof view
the requirement that a charge at the Bank
rate will be put on any shortfall and that
any non-interest bearing positive balance
must cover this shortfall means that they
have to paythecharge twice asmuch costs ">i
of both excess balances and overdrafts from
the Bank of Canada are about the same.
Consequently, caash managers always try
to attain zero balance at the beginning of
the period. Since it is often the case that on
a particular day they are hit by clearing
surprises which make them in a negative
or positive balances, adjustments of
balances to compensate the surprisesover
theaveraging period arealways needed so
that zero cumulative balance can be
achieved. It is these adjustments thatcreate
demand for deposit balances.
The behaviour of the demand is more
predictable than undertheprevious system.
Under the previous system most clearer
banks desire to hold relatively high excess
reserves to meet reserve requirements
because the rate on advances to cover over
drafts escalate with each overdraft. This
makes them less likely to risk overdrafts.
Therefore, the risk of overdrafts was not
constant throughout the period.
Accordingly, it is difficult for the Bank of
JEP Vol. 2, No. 1,1997
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Canada to know when direct clearers might
risk overdraft and hence determine the
supply adjustment needed to affect the
interest rate. On the other hand, under the
newsystem, clearer banksare equallylikely
to experience negative and positive
clearing surprises. Because both positive
and negative clearing surprises are equally
costly, the bank always try to compensate
these surprises. Tlierefore, when the direct
clearer banks are in a negative balance early
on, which is very likely, they surely want
to be in a positive balance later on over an
averaging period. The demand for deposit
balances, then, increases. The opposit is also
true. Thus, the demand is highly
predictable.
Supply of Deposit Balances
As mentioned earlier, the direct
clearer banks need deposit balances not just
to settle among themselves but also between
them and the Bank of Canada. As the bank
of the Federal Government of Canada as
well as a market participant in its own right,
clearings also happen between the Bank of
Canada and the direct clearers. It is through
this particular clearing that the Bank of
Canada controls the supply of deposits
balances. The control is conducted by
transferring government deposits out of or
into government accounts with direct
clearers. This technique is called the
"drawdown/redeposit mechanism". Tliis is
the primary way the Bank of Canada
conducts monetary policy. If it wants
interest rate to rise, the direct clearers'
account balances at the Bank of Canada are
in total made short by drawdowning
(transferring) government deposits out
JEP Vol. 2, No. 1,1997
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from their settlement accounts. This makes
the direct clearers compete among them
selves to borrow funds in interbank market
and reduce overdrafts and hence increases
interest rate. Conversely, the Bank of
Canada can redeposit government deposits
into the direct clearer' accounts so that these
account balances at the Bank of Canada are
in total in excess. They, then, try to get rid
of the idle funds at the bank of Canada by
competitively creatingoverdrafts. Thiswill
put a downward pressure on interest rates.
Therefore, despite the abolition of re
serve requirement, the Bank of Canada is
able to maintain its significant control over
the behaviour of interest rates by influenc
ing the output of banking-overdrafts and
deposits - which in turn affects aggregate
demand and prices.
Price Delerminacy Issue
FollowingPatinkin, Fama argues that
if there is a well-defined demand in real
terms for an asset that sells at face value
stated in units of account, controlling the
supply of the asset in terms of units of
account is sufficient to control the price
level, that is, the real value of the unit of
account. A closer look at the operation of
the Bank of Canada will indicate tliat Fama's
condition holds. Tlie desire of the direct
clearer banks to always adjust their clearing
position daily to an optimal position over
the averaging period, indeed creates a
well-defined demand for an asset whose
nominal supply is under the direct control
of tlie Bank of Canada. This asset, called
settlement funds or deposit balance at the
Bank, bears no interest. Thus Fama's con
dition forpricedeterminacy is satisfied.
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CONCLUSION
In thispaper,monetary policy under
zero reserve requirement with special
reference to Canada is reviewed. The elimi
nation of reserve requirements results in
the abandonment of the money multiplier
analytical framework. However, this does
not mean that the Bank of Canada looses
complete monetary control. An alternative
framework, called interest operating
procedure, that uses short-term overnight
interest rate as an intermediate target
provides a sufficient assurence tliat tlie Bank
ofCanadastillhasa significant control over
nominal magnitudes of the economy, that
is, interest rates which in turn affect
aggregate demand and prices.
Moreover, following Fama'srules for
price determinacy, the abandonment of
reserve requirement and the passive issu
ance ofcurrency does notcecessarily mean
that price level is indeterminate in Canada.
Instead, under the new arrangement the
existence of a well-defined demand for a
non-interest bearing asset ensures that price
level determinacy condition holds.
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